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Abstract The main lines of evidence taken as support for the
Bgesture-first^ hypothesis of language origins are briefly eval-
uated, and the problem that speech poses for this hypothesis is
discussed. I conclude that language must have evolved in the
oral–aural and kinesic modalities together, with neither mo-
dality taking precedence over the other.
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BGesture first^: Origins and difficulties
The idea that humans were first able to communicate in a
symbolic way by gesture, and so were able to develop lan-
guage, has a long history (Hewes, 1999). From the beginning
of the eighteenth century onward, when the natural origins of
language began to be discussed, the Bgesture-first^ idea was
put forward by several prominent thinkers—for example, by
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, in Paris in 1746 (Condillac,
2001), or by Giambattista Vico, in Naples in 1744 (Bergin &
Fisch, 1984). It was further sympathetically discussed in the
nineteenth century by Edward Tylor (1865), Garrick Mallery
(1881/1972), George Romanes (1898), and Wilhelm Wundt
(1901/1973), among others.
By the end of the nineteenth century, discussion of lan-
guage origins went into eclipse (Stam, 1976), but it began to
revive again in the late 1960s. An important contribution to
this revival was Hewes (1973), an article published inCurrent
Anthropology that attracted considerable commentary. Within
2 years, a large conference on the question was held at the
New York Academy of Sciences (Harnad, Steklis, &
Lancaster, 1976), since which time the issue has become a
major focus of academic activity.
Hewes’s 1973 article, which made a strong case for the
gesture-first hypothesis, was in part inspired by Beatrice and
Allen Gardner’s success in teaching a chimpanzee to use man-
ual actions based on signs from American Sign Language in
apparently symbolic ways (Gardner & Gardner, 1969). As
compared to previous attempts to teach apes to speak, which
had been failures (Hayes, 1951; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933),
the success of the Gardners’ project seemed spectacular. It
seemed to be a challenge to the idea that the Rubicon that
separates man from other animals and that, as Max Müller
declared, Bno brute will dare to cross^ (Müller, 1868, p.
354). For this reason, it now seemed very important to study
the nature of sign language, to determine its linguistic status.
Research proposed by Jacob Bronowski (Bronowski &
Bellugi, 1970), begun under Ursula Bellugi at the Salk
Institute in San Diego, at first aimed to investigate children
learning sign language to compare with Washoe. Soon it was
realized that the fundamental nature of sign language needed
investigation. The Signs of Language (Klima & Bellugi,
1979), presenting results from the first decade of this work,
confirmed and amplified that sign language is in every way a
proper language. Stokoe (1960) had already shown this, but
he received little attention until the new initiative in the study
of sign language began a decade later.
Since Hewes’s article, the gesture-first hypothesis has been
discussed and supported by many others (e.g., Arbib, 2012;
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Armstrong, Stokoe, & Wilcox 1995; Corballis, 2002; Stokoe,
2002; Tomasello, 2008). In what follows, I briefly review the
evidence commonly appealed to as supporting Bgesture first,^
but argue that it is far from conclusive. I discuss the problem
that human specialization as a speaking animal raises for any
gesture-first hypothesis, but also point out the importance of
taking into account the phenomena of co-speech gesturing in
any theory of language origins.
Evidence for Bgesture first^: Summary and critique
1. Vocalization in nonhuman primates. Since, for a long
time, it was understood that ape and monkey vocal com-
munication involved only a fixed repertoire of inarticulate
calls, under limited voluntary control, it was thought un-
likely that language would have evolved from this.
However, recent work on nonhuman primate vocaliza-
tion has shown that in many species it is much more
flexible, complex, and articulated than was previously
supposed (see Lemasson, 2011; Zuberbühler, Arnold, &
Slocombe, 2011). Vocalizing in combination with tongue
and lip displays such as lip-smacking, used in close and
friendly interactions, can suggest a model of how speech
could have derived from oral–aural actions. Although on-
ly humans have voluntary control of the larynx, mediated
by a direct connection to the cortex (Jurgens, 2000; see
also the review in Fitch, 2010, chap. 9), in the nonhuman
primate species that have been investigated (notably the
squirrel monkey; see Jurgens, 1998), the lips and tongue
are controlled by such a direct connection, and their
movements are under voluntary control. Combining visi-
ble displays of lips and tongue with vocalizing already
can make possible the production of a complex range of
sounds. It is not difficult to imagine the further modifica-
tions of neural control that would be needed for the full
voluntary control of articulated sound that the develop-
ment of speech would require (see Fitch, 2010, for a
review). It is notable that studies by Bergman (2013)
and by Ghazanfar, Takahashi, Mathur, and Fitch (2012)
have shown that lip-smacking in geladas is similar to hu-
man speech in its rhythmicity and developmental trajec-
tory, and in how the lips and tongue are coordinated. All
of this contributes to the idea that the articulatory com-
plexities of speech may have eventually developed from
mouth and tongue displays of this sort.
2. Ape gestures. In contrast, the flexibility and learnability of
forelimb gestures, especially in the great apes, makes this
modality seem more amenable as a medium in which
language could have first emerged (Pollick & de Waal,
2007). So far, however, although ape gesturing may be
comparable to human gestures serving in the management
of interpersonal relations—greeting, beckoning, offering,
rejecting, and so forth—gestures of a depictive or refer-
ential nature have not been reliably observed. As far as is
known, in captivity apes may engage in imperative
pointing, but not in declarative pointing, which human
children do from an early age.
3. Ape language experiments. The discovery that apes could
be taught to use hand gestures derived from sign language
in apparently symbolic ways seemed to confirm the idea
that gesture could have been the first languagemedium, as
was already mentioned (Wallman, 1992, pp. 10–28, de-
scribes ape language projects up to 1990). However, apes
only learn to use signs symbolically under the very special
conditions of close and continuous relationship with
humans. This work suggests a symbolic capacity in apes,
but tells little of how this capacity came to be expressed
naturally—if, in fact, it ever did.
4. Ontogenesis of speech and gesture. Studies of very young
children have suggested that pointing, followed by sym-
bolic gestures, preceded the acquisition of speech. This
has been considered compatible with a gesture-first posi-
tion (e.g., Meguerditchian, Cochet, & Vauclair, 2011)
Before the observations on the apparent prespeech ap-
pearance of pointing and symbolic gestures can be accept-
ed as support for gesture preceding speech phylogeneti-
cally, however, more will need to be understood about
whether and how vocalizations accompany these actions.
BBabbling,^ though it is not intelligible, constitutes an
attempt at speech. As Trevarthen (1979) and others have
observed, there is often close coordination between bab-
bling and hand movements, as if efforts toward symbolic
expression are being made both kinesically and orally.
Cochet and Vauclair (2010), in an observational study of
spontaneous declarative pointing in children between the
ages of approximately 11 months and a little over 3 years,
showed that most of the time these pointings were accom-
panied by vocalizations. A study by Grünloh and
Liszkowski (2015) of the vocalizations that co-occur with
pointing in prelinguistic infants showed that these may be
differentiated in such a way that they indicate whether the
pointing is imperative or declarative. Vocalizations before
language, thus, may well be attempts at meaningful expres-
sion, even though the infant does not yet have command of
any socially shared vocabulary. Such vocalizations deserve
much more study, from this point of view, than they have
hitherto received. Perhaps the appearance of intelligible ges-
ture prior to intelligible speech has been reported because
adults can more readily interpret semantically a baby’s kine-
sic expressions than than they can its oral expressions.
5. Sign languages. The fact that fully functional languages
can develop in the kinesic medium—as in sign languages
among the deaf—has been taken to support Bgesture
first.^ Thus, Tomasello (2008, p. 328) stated that the read-
iness with which humans can create sign languages, as
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exemplified by the emergence of Nicaraguan Sign
Language (Kegl, Senghas, & Coppola, 1999; Senghas,
Senghas, & Pyers, 2005), would be Bincredible, almost
inexplicable . . . [if] humans were adapted for a vocal lan-
guage only^; however, B[i]f humans were adapted first for
something like gestural communication, and the vocal
modality took over only later, then these gestural inven-
tions are much more readily explained.^ Perhaps so; how-
ever, it would have been just as persuasive if Tomasello
had written, Bif humans were also adapted for something
like gestural communication.^ As I will suggest again
below, there seems to be no reason to suppose that the
development of a capacity for symbolic expression was
at first confined to only one modality.
The study of sign languages is relevant to the problem
of language origins, not because they might be models for
early forms of language or may support Tomasello’s
claim, but because we can sometimes observe their for-
mation and the conditions under which this happens. For
example, examining how signers invent new signs when
they lack an expression for something allows us to witness
the process through which linguistic symbols are created,
and how they become transformed as they become social-
ly shared (Tylor, 1865, made this point). As they become
freed from depending upon iconicity for intelligibility,
they can function as Saussurean elements within a dia-
chronic system. When this is studied within the social
conditions in which these transformations occur, insight
is gained into the processes through which language as a
socially shared system comes into being. Modern signers,
however, as fully evolved humans for whom deafness is
only an accidental feature, cannot throw light on earlier
stages of language evolution.
6. Speaker gesturing. The complex use of manual gestures
by speakers that are integrated with speech was said by
Hewes (1973) to indicate that speech was a later addition
to an already existing gesture system.
However, the fact that speaker gesturing is fully inte-
grated into the utterances of which it forms a part
(Kendon, 2004, 2014; McNeill, 1992) suggests that spo-
ken expression and manual expression evolved conjoint-
ly, not that gesturing persisted as a leftover that speech
overlaid. As will be noted later, many speaker gestures
appear to be derivatives of object-handling actions. This
may suggest the original praxic nature of language, but
not the primitiveness of gesture (see Kendon, 2009).
7. Neurology. Neurological investigations have shown that
hand and mouth actions are controlled by very closely
related systems. The detailed knowledge being developed
about this underlines the co-involvement of hand and
mouth, in both languaging and practical activities.
Comparative studies should throw light on the evolution-
ary history of this partnership. At present, however, all we
can say is that this supports arguments for the joint evo-
lution of these systems as well as it supports arguments
claiming the precedence of hand over mouth (see, e.g.,
Gentilucci & Dalla Volta, 2007; Kimura, 1993; Willems
& Hagoort, 2007).
8. Mirror neurons. The discovery of mirror neurons was
hailed by Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) as offering a solu-
tion to what they called the Bparity problem^—how con-
specifics can mutually understand each others’ actions,
whether communicative or praxic—a problem that would
have to be solved to allow the development of language.
Arbib has since developed his Bmirror system
hypothesis,^ in which he supposes that language eventu-
ally became possible because of the mutual understanding
of grasping actions made possible by the mirror system
(Arbib, 2012). However, many problems remain regard-
ing the nature and role of mirror neurons, whether in
macaque monkeys or in humans. In particular, as
Hickock (2009) pointed out, it is far from clear whether
mirror neurons play any role in the processes through
which individuals understand the actions of others. It
seems much more likely that these processes would have
more to do with the processes involved in an individual’s
own motor control (Hickock, 2014). The claim that the
discovery of mirror neurons offered strong support for the
gesture-first view of language origins (e.g., Corballis,
2010) now seems overstated.
Although these eight lines of evidence may make a plausi-
ble case for the Bgesture-first^ view, in my opinion they do not
make a compelling one. Furthermore, because humans are
specialized as speaking animals (Ghazanfar & Rendall,
2008; Lenneberg, 1967), any Bgesture-first^ theory would re-
main incomplete until it could offer a satisfactory account of
why this should be. The specializations for speaking, in regard
to both the production of speech and its reception, are complex
and extensive, and would have required a long period of time
to evolve. This implies that the oral–aural modality must have
long been involved in whatever changes in effecting commu-
nicative actions were taking place that ultimately gave rise to
linguistic communication. We must suppose that these devel-
opments came about as part of a trend toward greater com-
plexity in communication generally, changes that were prob-
ably linked to changes in the complexities of social organiza-
tion (Freeberg, Dunbar, & Ord, 2012) and in the management
of face-to-face interaction (Levinson, 2006). These changes,
involving the oral–aural modality, would surely also have in-
volved the kinesic modality. We may suppose, for example,
that concomitant with developments in oral articulatory skill
and the voluntary control of the larynx, changes would have
taken place in the complexity and subtlety of control of the
musculature of the human face, or changes such as those lead-
ing to the white sclera of the eyes becoming visible, a human-
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specific feature that facilitates the subtle detection of where
another individual is looking (Kobayashi & Koshima, 2001).
These are but two of the more obvious human features that
appear to be specific adaptations for close and complex face-
to-face interaction, involving many different action systems.
The orchestration of these different systems using different
modalities, which is so impressive a feature of human face-
to-face interaction (see, e.g., Goodwin 2000), gives a strong
reason to suppose that both vocal and kinesic forms of com-
munication were intimately involved all along, as humans
developed languaging.
In a recent article, written in part as a response to an earlier
discussion of mine (Kendon, 2011), Michael Corballis (2014)
offered a review of the evidence adduced in support of the
Bgesture-first^ position in much the way I have tried to do
here. He agreed with me that the evidence makes a plausible
case for the Bgesture-first^ view, but for him it also supports
this view, although he conceded that it does so only Bfairly
marginally^ (p. 190). He remains persuaded by the Bgesture-
first^ idea mainly because, despite recent evidence that apes
do show some degree of voluntary control of their vocal pro-
ductions, this remains very limited, and is in marked contrast
to the versatility with which apes use gestures, often including
ways that can almost be regarded as symbolic. In his view this
makes it much more likely that language began with gestures,
only later involving the oral–aural modality as well.
As Corballis pointed out, the difference between my view
and his is not very great. Like him, as will be seen in the next
section, I think the articulated vocalization that speech uses
could have arisen through a development that involved the
combining of lip and tongue displays with vocalization. I like-
wise agree with him that language is deeply connected to
practical action and may be a derivation from it (a point to
be discussed below). I also think that Corballis would agree
that the key shift that was required to make practical actions
(whether by mouth or by hand) available as material for some-
thing that could become language was that these actions
should become able to refer to things not immediately present
and be recognized as having this function. This would enable
users to share imagined rather than real actions. Once this can
happen, the way is open for dialogues about things imagined
(cf. Kendon, 1991). This would be crucial if a system of com-
munication were to develop into something we would regard
as Blanguage.^ That Corballis (2013) would be sympathetic to
this view is shown by his discussion of the importance of what
he calls Bmental time travel,^ which, with language, makes it
possible for us to share memories, plans, and ideas. However,
unlike Corballis (2013), I think that the shift into symbolic use
would have affected both visible action and oral–aural action
at the same time. As sign languages and Bpicture writing
systems^ (semaisographic systems; Sampson, 1985) have
taught us, you can build a language in any modality. All kinds
of behavior can become symbolic. Given the intimate
coordinated relationship between hand actions and the mouth
actions of speaking, which we have already noted and must
have been established at a very early stage in primate evolu-
tion (see Wise, 2009), it is not clear to me why, if a symbolic
use of behavior became established, this would occur first
only in visible bodily action, and not in oral–aural action as
well.
The question of speech
As we have already noted, humans, in various ways—neuro-
logical and anatomical—are specialized for the production
and reception of speech. Gesture-first theorists have recog-
nized this, but none have offered a good framework that can
account for it. Some have asked: Why is it, if the ancestors of
Homo developed a sign language, did they then change to a
spoken language? There must have been a switch from one
modality to the other (see Corballis, 2002; Hewes, 1973;
Tomasello, 2008). What brought this about?
The answer has usually been to list the advantages of
speech over gesture. For example, it is said to be faster than
signing, and if speech is used, the hands can do other things at
the same time, something that is not possible if the hands are
busy signing. Speech can be understood in the dark, and it also
allows for communication in environments where the parties
cannot see one another—for example, in wooded areas.
Such advantages cannot serve to answer the question of
why speech was selected. Evolution does not work in terms
of possible but as-yet-unrealized advantages. It works only by
gradual modifications of existing systems selected for their
greater effectiveness for current functions. This can and does
result in changes, allowing the modified system to be capable
of new functions, which may then be selected for. The evolu-
tionary changes that eventually led to speech did lead to new
things along the way, but these new things did not guide the
process.
The very question of a Bswitch^ seems inappropriate, how-
ever, since it seems to imply that speech or gesture were al-
ready available possibilities and that a choice could have be
made between them. This surely was never the case. As
Darwin (1871, pp. 58–59) pointed out, B[a]s all the higher
mammals possess vocal organs constructed on the same gen-
eral plan as ours, and which are used as a means of commu-
nication, it was obviously probable, if the power of commu-
nication had to be improved, it would have been still further
adapted.^ Evolution builds on what is already there, and the
vocal apparatus, already part of the mammalian plan and used
as a system for communication, would have been the frame-
work within which further developments in communicative
mouth and voice actions would have taken place. Human
speech must be the outcome of a very long process of modi-
fication to already-existing modes of vocal expression,
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developing from prior stages in which, as social life became
more complex, increasingly complex articulated phonations
were used, perhaps in chorusing, and in dialogic exchanges,
whether playful, flirtatious, affiliative, competitive, or agonis-
tic. If the oral–aural modality always was a component of such
interactions along with kinesis, the issue of whether gesture or
speech came first does not arise: Both modalities served com-
municatively from the beginning.
What drove the oral–aural modality to develop articulatory
complexity? Comparative studies of several different species
of monkeys have shown correlations between the complexity
of vocal repertoires and the complexity of social organization
(Gustison et al., 2012; McComb & Semple 2005). This has
also been found in birds, squirrels, and bats (see the references
in Freeberg, 2006). Similar correlations between the complex-
ity of social life and the complexity and variety of facial
displays in various species of monkey have been found by
Maestripieri (1999, 2005) and by Dobson (2009). Freeberg,
Dunbar, and Ord (2012) provide a comprehensive review and
discussion of this point, proposing what they term the social
complexity hypothesis for communication. This proposes that
more complex social systems will require members to employ
more complex communication systems. That is, there will be a
wider and more diverse repertoire of communicative signals,
both vocal and visible, in societies that are larger, have differ-
entiated social roles and more complex interaction networks,
and include maintained pair relationships (as between mates,
but also long-term friend relationships), than in societies that
have fewer of these features. This means, of course, that any
evolutionary account of human language will have to take
account of the evolution of social complexity in the species
to be considered.
Iconicity
Even if we can suggest factors that might have contributed to
the elaboration of complexity in vocal (and gestural) expres-
sion and can see possible models for precursors to human
speech in phenomena such as vocalized lip-smacking displays
in baboons or girneys in Japanese macaques (Green, 1975),
the issue of how these gestures acquired symbolic significance
still eludes us. It is often maintained that in human speech
linguistic symbols are Barbitrary.^ This makes it difficult to
see how they could have been derived from sounds that have
any sort of iconic relationship to the features of their referents.
In sign language this is different. Many signs in all sign lan-
guages studied can be understood as having developed from
actions depictive of object appearance or of actions of some
sort (see Taub, 2001). The transitions that we can sometimes
observe, in sign language, from pantomimimc or descriptive
gestures to arbitrary expressions that conform to the
formational constraints of the language system, is seen by
many to provide a general model for the process by which
linguistic signs come into being.
Though the arbitrary relationship between word form and
word meaning has long been the dominant doctrine, there have
always been those who have foundmuch evidence for iconicity
in spoken language. This claim (as well as its opposite) was
discussed in Plato’s Cratylus, and the debate has persisted ever
since (Genette, 1995). Interest in iconicity in spoken language
has begun to grow lately. Taking cues from sign languages, and
also from studies of grammaticalization in spoken languages, it
seems clear that iconicity is widespread in spoken languages, as
it is in sign languages. Some, such as Talmy Givon, consider it
fundamental. Thus Givon (1985, p. 214) has written, Bfor us to
understand the ‘magic’ of symbolic representation, we ought to
consider iconicity the truly general case in the coding, repre-
sentation and communication of experience and [arbitrary]
symbols as a mere extreme case on the iconic scale.^ Modes
of expressive action, whether kinesic or oral–aural, all have
their iconic potential. This appears to be especially exploited
when new expressions are being formed. The features that can
be expressed iconically, however, will be different, according to
whether the medium is oral–aural or kinesic. Engaging in ac-
tions (vocal or kinesic) that depict features of what is being
referred to is fundamental to how either sounds or actions can
be made as representations. That is, the ability to engage in
mimesis (and of course, in its reciprocal, the ability to recognize
an action or a sound as mimetic) is what made the development
of language possible (Donald, 1991).
Contrary to what has often been maintained, there is support
for the view that the kinesic medium is not markedly favored, in
this respect, over the oral–aural medium. Evidence from studies
of sound symbolism (Hinton, Nichols, & Ohala, 1994), the
mimetic and depictive potentials of the nonverbal capacities
of the vocal medium (Perlman, Dale, & Lupyan, 2015), studies
of ideophones (Voeltz & Kilian-Hatz, 2001), and the example
of so-called mimetics in Japanese (Hamano, 1998), among
much else, supports the notion that iconicity is as fundamental
a feature of the vocal as of the kinesic modality (see also
Dingemanse et al., 2015; Nuckolls, 1999; Perniss &
Vigliocco, 2014). This is less apparent in spoken than in sign
languages partly because spoken languages are so very ancient.
Once spoken languages begin to develop—building words out
of existing words through all the potentials for sound recombi-
nations offered by phonology, acquiring and modifying words
from other languages, and so on—and given the pervasiveness
of meaning extension, iconicity can be obscured or overlaid.
These processes occur in sign languages also, but communities
of signers are rare, and hitherto have not lasted for very long
periods. Consequently, there has probably been insufficient
time for these processes to have had as pervasive effects as they
have in spoken languages.
I conclude, thus, that the mimetic process is common and
important for both the vocal and kinesic modalities. If this is
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the case, a Bgesture-first^ theory of language emergence may
be unnecessary.
Why speakers mobilize their hands when speaking
However, there remains the issue of why, in speakers, the
hands and other bodily articulators are often mobilized when
someone engages in utterances. Work on speaker gestures,
investigating how they relate to speech (see Kendon, 2004;
McNeill, 1992, 2000), has shown that gesturing and speaking
are components of a single process of utterance generation.
Gesturing must be considered as much a part of languaging as
speaking is. As the brief review above of the evidence called
to support Bgesture first^ has shown, it does not make a com-
pelling case for Bgesture first,^ but it does make a compelling
case that gesturing is a part of languaging.An account of why
this is so will be needed if we are to explain language
evolution.
A survey of examples, taken from video-recordings made
at various kinds of interactional occasions, shows that these
speaker manual actions domany different things (see Kendon,
2004, chaps. 9–10). For example, they serve to provide di-
mensional and dynamic information about the objects or ac-
tions that a speaker is talking about. They can give informa-
tion about the relative dimensions, shape, or spatial position-
ing of nominated objects, or they may refer to the manner of
the action named by a verb. Entities created as Bvirtual
entities^ through manual action can be moved about or placed
in relation to one another, or the hands can create visual dia-
grams or movement pattern demonstrations, in this way giv-
ing visible form to abstract relationships referred to in speech.
Such use shows, in terms of visible actions, the propensity for
concepts to be derived from our experience and interactions
with the physical environment, its contents, and our spatial
conception of it. This supports the view that we use the expe-
riences of our body and how we operate with it in the physical
world as a framework for thinking about things that are more
abstract (Cienki & Müller, 2008).
It should also be noted that many of the manual movements
that speakers make seem to be enactments, albeit highly sche-
matized, of the illocutionary forces of the units of spoken
discourse. As speech act theory proposes, any act of speaking
is also a mode of action. Thus in saying something one may
assert, request, deny, withdraw, hold up, stop, offer, present,
indicate, and a host of other actions. Very often the manual
actions associated with speaking express these kinds of
Bpragmatic meanings^ rather than information related to the
propositional content of the discourse (Kendon, 2004, chaps.
11–13; Streeck, 2009, chap. 8).
Speaker manual actions, thus, are a part of utterances both
in terms of action and at the level of conceptual expression;
they are an integral part of what is being said and done when
someone is languaging. Their forms of action, understood as
referring to conceptual categories, may enter directly into the
structure of the utterance, or they may also display what kind
of a speech action or move is being done with an utterance.
How are gestures recognized as meaningful in these
ways? As was already suggested, they are forms of action
that—although schematized, abbreviated, and often
conventionalized—tend to be recognized as derived from
forms of practical action, such as sketching, object manipula-
tion, brushing away, smoothing a surface, grasping an object,
doing something with an object, and the like (Müller, 2014).
In my view, this suggests that gestures can best be understood
as forms of action derived from how one uses one’s hands to
show or change the shape or form of things—to pick things
up, let them drop from one’s hands, place one’s hands around
an object, grasp an object, do something with an object, carry
out patterns of action, and so forth. It seems they are under-
stood exactly as actions of this sort, and that, once a person is
able to perform the action, he or she can arrive at its aim,
providing a clue to the concept (or class of concept) that the
gesture is used to conjure up.
DavidMcNeill (2016) opposes the view offered here on the
grounds that gestures cannot combine with speech if they have
real-world practical aims. However, in my view, gestures, like
speech, operate to conjure forth virtual worlds, which are the
worlds we inhabit when languaging.Words and gestures labor
together to produce virtual objects that serve as conceptual
expressions. The co-involvement of gesturing with speech—
where gestures are schematic forms abstracted from practical
action—indicates that languaging is derived from practical
action. This leads to the suggestion that speaking, like co-
occurring manual gesturing, is manipulatory activity in the
abstract. The hands and the mouth, as executive organs, inti-
mately linked as they are, work in conjunction when the indi-
vidual is engaged in acting on the world and interacting with
other beings. Accordingly, these executive organs are likewise
mobilized when the world is virtual, as when we language.
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